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INTRODUCTION 
The New Zealand Family Court rightly seeks to emphasize parental deci-
sion-making in child placement upon marital dissolution. There is broad 
satisfaction with the operation of the counselling and mediation procedure 
which gives parents this voice. 1 However, when the experience of women 
is considered, it is apparent that faith in the new system is based on as-
sumption rather than reality. It is assumed that because the Family Court is 
non-adversarial, it must be women-friendly, and that it answers feminist 
criticism of the law, as reflecting male values of objectivity and fixity of 
rules. 2 
The criteria for judging the success of the new approach is based on a 
further assumption. Success is equated with reaching agreement and avoid-
ing litigation before the court. 3 It is assumed that as custody cases are rela-
tively rare, mediation works. In fact, the avoidance of court cases is a poor 
indicator of success. This is suggested by a Department of Justice survey, 
which found that approximately half of custody and access issues of separat-
ing couples are settled privately, without any assistance from court services. 
Of those who seek court help, only about one third of the cases are settled 
through counselling. 4 
The significance of the assumption lies less in its inaccuracy than in what 
it overlooks. The quality of the agreement reached and the manner in 
which it is arrived at, are more important than the mere fact of its ex-
istence. The Department of Justice survey5 indicates reduced levels of saris--
faction when the decision reached involves lawyer, counsellor or court.
6 At 
six months, when satisfaction with care and visiting arrangements was 
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judge B Barteau (address presented at "The Family Court rn Years On", 
New Zealand Family Law conference, Wellington, rggo) 2rn. 
K Bartlett "Feminist Legal Methods" ( r990) ro3 Harvard LR 829. 
G Maxwell,J Robertson and P Vincent ·'Children, Parents and the Family 
Court" ( 1991) 3 FLB 38. 
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assessed, only 48 per cent were satisfied with the agreed arrangements, and 
31 per cent were dissatisfied with the care arrangements. 7 
While client "satisfaction" may be a subjective approach to assessing the 
success of a mediated settlement, it is more reliable than assuming success 
on the basis of the existence of agreements because it is the judgement of 
the user of the system. It indicates a need to examine the process further. 
This paper looks beyond assumptions. It examines the operation of the 
counselling/mediation function of the family court, using the various 
schools of feminist legal analysis as a framework. My primary object is to 
discuss what I perceive to be the problem ::i.reas for women in counselling/ 
mediation. My second object is to relate these problems to feminist theory.8 
I ::i.ssess how the process has worked out for the women who are the court's 
clients. I adopt as my template of 'success' the feminist objective of em-
powering women. Catharine Mackinnon identifies the objective as ending 
"enforced subordination, limited options and social powerlessness- on the 
basis of sex. " 9 She argues for the empowering of women on women's own 
terms. 10 
We seek not only to be valued as who we are, but co have access to the process 
of the definition of value itself. In this way, our demand for access becomes 
also a demand for change. 
2 
I conclude that the process of mediation/counselling fails to empower 
women. It fails because the external framework (counselling/mediation con-
ference) is confused in its purpose and denies women voice. It fails because 
the internal dynamic of mediation, including power imbalances and the 
gender-neutral rules which are ::i.pplied, disadvantage women. It fails because 
custody law has become private law, and is beyond public scrutiny. I there-
fore make "demand for change" so that the process of mediation/counsel-
7 G Maxwell and J Robertson " Moving Apart: A Study of the Role of Family 
Court Counselling Services" (an unpublished report to the Department 
ufjustjce, Wellington, ry93). 
8 Where relevant, I also relate the New Zealand experience ta the Ameri-
can jurisprudence as a point of comparison. 
g C Mackinnon Feminism Unrrwdified (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1987) 22. 
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ling which promises so much may indeed "empower women on their own 
terms.'' 
I THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK'' 
The irreconcilable breakdown of marriage is the only ground for its dissolu-
tion. Before a marriage can be dissolved, the court must be satisfied that 
suitable arrangements have been made for the care of the children. 12 Pri-
vate arrangements may be made, but where there is any disagreement, or 
one parent makes an application for custody, or for a separation order, the 
parents are referred to counselling. 13 The counsellor must first attempt to 
reconcile the parents. 14 Counselling may be individual or conjoint, regard-
less of whether it is requested or directed. 
If no agreement is reached in counselling, the couple attend a mediation 
conference accompanied by their lawyers, and presided over by a Family 
Court judge, who has the power to make consent orders. 15 
Court proceedings are available as a last resort, and it is possible for the 
judge who was the mediator to hear a defended hearing. 
Mediation 16 has thus made the transition from innovation to mainstream, 
and has been institutionalized in the Family Court.'i 
The task now is to consider whether what is done now could be done better, 
and whether what may already be done is the right thing to be doing. 
In this context, I believe that "the right thing" should be the empower-
ment of women. 
ll 
I2 
For a fuller outline, rete r Appendix One. 
The Family Proceedings Act rg8o, s 45. 
Ahove n 12, s 10. 
14 Above n 12, s 1 r. 
15 Above n 12, s 14. 
r6 Mediation is an umbrella te rm in New Zealand, embracing both counsel-
ling and mediation conferences. 
17 I MacDuff " Assessing Mediation" ( 1g86) r FLB 55, 57. 
] 
II COUNSELLING AND CONTEXT: CULTURAL FEMINISM 
The feminist school of 'Cultural Feminism' is centred around Gilligan's 
different voice theory. 18 Gilligan studied the reasoning processes of girls and 
boys, and concluded that, in general, women's moral system is contextual, 
with an emphasis on care and connection, whereas men's is hierarchical. 
Women's voices emphasize nurturing, empathy and relationships. Men's 
emphasize competition, aggressiveness and autonomous individualism. This 
is also called the difference model. Women are different and this should be 
valued. 
Thus, for mediation/counselling to meet this model, it must provide a 
vehicle for the expression of emotion and the valuing of relationships. 
Radical feminists reject difference theory. Catharine Mackinnon has said 
that the voice (moral system) identified by Carol Gilligan is simply the 
voice of subordinated women, and that we do not know what women who 
are not subordinated sound like. Difference theory reinforces submissive-
ness.19 Mackinnon may well be correct, and the 'voice' identified by Carol 
Gilligan may be 'different' only as a reflection of societal disempowerrnent. 
However, to ignore that voice in mediating/counselling is only to further 
disempower women. I therefore accept the 'voice' and would change the 
process so that it may be heard. 
The American jurisprudence suggests the 'voice' is not being heard. Gril-
lo20 says that modem 'no fault' divorce, combined with the no rules and 
compromise required in mediation, effectively prevents women finding 
voice. In the emphasis on the practical working out of future care arrange-
ments for children, there is no room to review relationships. In fact, Ricci 
(an American mediator) describes women's prioritization of relationships as 
a "self-defeating pattern in women". 21 American mediation may also sup-
18 C Gilligan Jn a Different Voice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts, 1g82) 1-39. 
19 E Dubois, M Dunlap, C Gilligan, C Mackinnon and C Menkel-Meadow 
"Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law-a Conversation" ( 1985) 
'.34 Buffalo LR u, 27. 
20 T Grillo "The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women" 
( 1991) roo Yale LJ 1567. 
2r I Ricci "Mediator's Notebook: Reflections on Promoting Equal Empower-
ment and Entitlements for Women" ( 1985) 8 Journal of Divorce 49. 
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press the cathartic release of emotion integral to care and connection. 
Saposnek, in a mediator's guide, views the expression of feelings as anti-
thetical to problem solving.ZZ Other mediators argue that the communica-
tion of anger in mediation should be circumscribed.23 Others allow both 
parties to communicate anger when one has been the victim of sustained 
abuse in the marriage. 24 That is to deny the legitimacy of the anger of the 
abused partier , 
The New Zealand experience also reflects these problems. I submit that 
the division of the New Zealand process into counselling and mediation has 
created confusion as to the role of counselling. As mediation conferences 
are available only for those for whom counselling fails, dispute resolution 
must be expected to occur in counselling. If the emphasis is placed on 
dispute resolution, then the therapeutic aspect-the vehicle for expression 
of the woman's voice-is lost. 
A consideration of the difference in definition between counselling and 
mediation/dispute resolution makes this apparent. Pritchard describes coun-
selling as:25 
[a]n intervention process aimed at assisting people to achieve personal growth 
and change, both for enhancement of personal goals, as well as to enhance the 
individual's relationship with others. 
Mediation is the intervention into a dispute of a neutral third party who 
has no authoritative decision-making power, to assist contending parties to 
reach voluntarily their own mutually acceptable settlements for issues in 
dispute. 26 It is a goals-focused process, directed at achieving specific out-
comes. 
Clearly, the two processes are different, but somehow have to be com-
bined. It is not surprising that one observer concludes, "just where media-
22 Saposnek " Mediating Child Custody Disputes" ( 1983), quoted in above n 
20, 1574. Refer below n 30 for the New Zealand experience which paral-
lels this. 
S Rogers and C Francy in above n 20, 1574. 
Above n 20, 1575. 
R Pritchard, quoted by H Lapsley, N Robertson and R Busch " Domestic 
Protection Study: Family Court Counselling" ( 1983) 3 FLB 152, 155. 
C Moore The Mediation Process (Jossy-Bass, San Francisco, California, 
1987) . 
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tion and conciliation end and where counselling and therapy begin, in 
practice, is still a matter of conjecture.• •li Parry and Pritchard go further. 
After acknowledging that in "Counselling", counselling and mediation 
sh.ould be a "happy blend", they say it18 
often ends up being a sort of Clayton's option-the counselling (or mediation) 
you have when you are not having counselling (or mediation). 
In this confusion, the therapeutic approach may be lost. The comments 
of both counsellors and women clients confirm that this happens. One 
counselling coordinator stated directly that context has no place:29 
Family Court counselling is often seen as therapy when it is goal oriented. 
Rhonda Pritchard30 comments that after 10 years in practice as a coun-
sellor and, having accepted many Family Court referrals, she is uneasy 
(J 
when she hears the counselling coordinator on the phone, because she 
knows that, in addition to fulfilling the counselling role for which she is 
trained, she may also have to act as a referee, a mediator. Referring to the 
outcome for clients, she states, "So often what is left is disillusionment and 
disappointment-at the counsellor's failure to 'resolve' a child care or access 
dispute, to 'bring back' a partner who has left .. " 
Client comments reflect this: 31 
But the whole counselling really was very traumatic and I think that whilst 
obviously the court wanted to resolve the custody situation primarily, I really 
felt there shoulcf have been some assistance towards resolving what caused our 
problems .... I think if we had had better counselling, if [ex-partner] had had 
time for counselling to actually explain her feelings more and so on as opposed 
GP Davidson, Senior Lecturer, Dept of Psychological Medicine, Welling-
ton ClinjcaJ School of Medicine, Wellington I lospital " Family Court 
Coun:';elling and Mediation". ( rg86) r FLB 73. 
Above n 2_'). 
Above n 25. 
" Access to Lhc Family Court-Meeting the Needs and Finances of the 
Consumer: A Counsellor's Perspective" (paper presented Lo "The Family 
Court rn Years On", New Zealand Family Law conference, Wellington, 
1990) 2!0. 
A l Iarland "Custody and Access Orders: Interviews with Parents about 
Their Court Experience" (Family Court Custody and Access Research 
Report 4, Department of Justice, Wellington) 40. 
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to simply resolving the custody situation in that the results -Mrnld have been 
more beneficial to [son!. 
She [the counsellor! wasn't making any sense. As far as I could see, what I was 
picking up, she wanted to get it out of the way and over and done with. That 
is the reaction I got from that. Like I said I wasn ' t pleased after I came out of 
there. 
The Counselling Research Report to the Department of Justice thus 
concluded: ''There are real needs in the clients, which are not being met 
by the current range of Family Court services.' '32 
A tension exists between the terminology the Family Court uses to de-
scribe the first stage of its process, counselling, and its intention, which is 
to achieve dispute resolution. To ensure that women's voices are heard, 
that there is a place for context and emotion, the term counselling should 
be retained, but its purpose must be counselling (not disguised mediation). 
Clients should be referred to both a counsellor and a mediator. This would 
entail acceptance by the court of the legitimacy and importance of dealing 
with individual client needs, and the provision of additional services to 
ensure availability of personal counselling. Once feelings and insights have 
been addressed, the mediator can focus on addressing individual interests 
and solutions. The mediation envisaged is far removed from the current 
judge-led Mediation Conference, and is discussed further below. 
m MEDIATION33 AND CONTROL: RADICAL FEMINISM 
Some radical feminists argue that women's societal disempowerment stems 
from sexual domination. Gender is a system of power relations. Historically, 
society has given men the power to control women.34 
Dominance is an issue in counselling and mediation. I will now identify 
four controlling factors in counselling/mediation which act as impediments 
32 
33 
34 
CM Maxwell, R Pritchard, J Robertson "A Counsellor's Perspective on the 
Family Court and Its Clients" (Family Court Counselling Report 2, De-
partment ofjustice, Wellington, 1990) 32. 
Mediation is here 11sed in its umbrella sense to embrace both counselling 
and the mediation conference. 
A Dworkin Our 8/,ood: Prophecies and Discourse on Sexual, Politics (Harper-
Collins, New York, 1~>76). 
7 
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to the empowerment of women, and which ensure that society continues to 
control women. 
The first factor is imbalance between the parties. Parkinson has identified 
several inequalities in bargaining power, which may affect women, includ-
ing emotional dominance and emotional blackmail, and the physical power 
of actual or threatened violence.35 To this could be added familiarity with 
negotiation situations and financial strength. In a situation of impasse, 
where the goal is to produce agreement, the stronger party can resist mak-
ing any settlement. Pressure is then transferred to the weaker party to be 
'reasonable', to compromise. 
Research evidence suggests that women make the compromises. 36 
The only way anything could have been solved at that place was for one of us 
to give in, and he wasn't willing to, so I did. 
and again:37 
We were in there for hours and I really felt taken over. I came out with a 
splitting headache and I felt totally drained. I went home and I said, 'I've 
agreed to it but I don't know why.' Two months later, I thought, 'Why the 
hell did I listen to that woman?' I was right all the time. I regret every minute 
of it. We went through hell because I gave in. 
Women are more vulnerable to pressure when the bargaining inequality 
they experience is fear they will lose their children. 38 
If a woman's got custody, then it's a case of, well he has a right to see his 
children and don't you think you ought to try and be a bit reasonable ... you 
know, sometimes I used to come out of there thinking, well maybe I am being 
a bit mean; maybe I'm not looking at it clearly. 
Women are also vulnerable when the bargaining inequality they ex-
perience is a violent relationship. Astor states categorically that violence 
35 B Parkinson in G Davis Partisans and MediaJ,i:m: The Resolution of Divorce 
Disputes (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) 63. 
36 Above n 35, 64. 
37 Above n 35, 64. 
38 Above n 35, 64. 
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creates "an extreme imbalance of power between the parties" and on that 
ground excludes all disputes involving violence from mediation. 39 
She argues that male violence in the home is not characterized by 'con-
flict about' issues but by 'control over' one person by another. 40 Because it 
is about control of a relationship, it is not possible to separate off the vio-
lence from issues such as money, custody and access. When there is con-
trol, there is inevitably power. 
Merry has gone so far as to claim that "with few exceptions, a mediated 
settlement reflects the status inequalities between the disputants". So a 
mutually acceptable solution tends to be one in which the less powerful 
gives up more. In our society, that is more often women. 
The second controlling factor in counselling/mediation is the mediator. 
Neumann identifies nine ways in which the mediator exercises power or 
control: 
(1) creating the ground rules; 
(2) choosing the topic; 
(3) deciding who may speak; 
(4) controlling the length of time a person may speak; 
(5) allowing and timing a person's response; 
(6) determining which spouse may present a proposal to the other; 
(7) presenting an interpretation of what the spouse said; 
(8) ending the discussion; 
(9) writing down the agreement. 
As she observes: ''The mediator actually has the most power in the 
room.'' 41 
This is situational power. The danger arises when counsellors use it to 
become 'directive' as research suggests some do. 42 
39 
41 
42 
If Astor "Violence and Family Mediation Policy" ( 1994) 8 Australian 
journal of Family Law 4. 
Above n 39, 5. Violence is discussed further in relation to mandatory 
counselling (below). 
D Neumann " Ilow Medjation Can Effectively Address the Male-Female 
Power Imbalance in Divorce" ( 1991-1992) g Mediation Quarterly 232. 
A Lee, A Harland, G Hall "Custody and Access Issues", New Zealand 
Suffrage Centennial Women '.r Law Conferenu Pa/J(m ( Conference Publishing, 
Wellington, 1993) 285. 
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LO 
They said it [custody] should be shared basically. 4 l 
The counsellor just says 'Look, he's going to get access, he'll get it somehow or 
other. '44 
However, control is a much more significant issue in mediation confer-
ences. In fact, the name 'mediation' is something of a misnomer. A Eimily 
Court judge acting as mediator, inevitably has authority derived from his/ 
her status and experience and knowledge of the law. The judge can and 
does indicate to the participants the parameters of an adjudicated settle-
ment and guide them to an acceptable private resolution. This takes con-
trol away from the parties. 45• 46 
When the judge offers his view on the matter then the parties will often adopt 
that Just because it is said. 
The reality of the thing is a judge trying to get the parties to knuckle under. 
The judges and lawyers interviewed by Barry and Henaghan saw this as 
an advantage. 47 Those surveyed see the judge as a chairman, with know-
ledge, someone in whom the parties can have confidence and "who will 
make a decision for them if they themselves cannot reach agreement. " 48 
Ludbrook49 endorses the 'directive' approach believing that "in the forum 
of the conference these comments would not be judgments. " 50 In practice, 
judicial comments are 'judgments'; participants surrender to the mediator 
the power to work out solutions to their disputes. 
The clients' comments in the Barry and Henaghan research demonstrate 
this. 
(a) All but two of the participants said they perceived the mediator 
to be a judge. 
43 
44 
45 
Above n 42. 
Above. n 42. 
This has greater impact on women. [his is addressed in the discussion of 
the ideological stance of the judicial direction, helow Section IV. 
N Barry and M I Ienaghan quoting a lawyer interviewed in their survey for 
·'Mediation in the Family Court" ( rg86) r FLB 84, 85. 
Above n 46. 
Above n 46. 
Ludbrook Famil:y Law (Brooker & Friend, Wellington, 1983) chapter r. 
Above n 49. 
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II 
(b) All participants reported that they found it difficult to contradict 
the suggestions and directions of the mediator. 
(c) Most indicated that the general format of the mediator's recom-
mendations constituted the decision reached. 
(d) Many said that the mediator imposed his or her own value 
judgements on the mediation process. 
(e) No participants reported that they had control over the conduct 
of the conference. 
(f) Only three participants reported that they had full, fair and equal 
opporrunity to express their views and opinions. 
(g) Few participants reported that they assumed an active role. 
(h) No participants reported that they had control over the final 
decision reached in mediation. 51 
In effect, mediation conferences have become pre-trial hearings, with 
little distinction between mediation and adjudication. Decision-making has 
been taken out of the hands of the participants. As many of these partici-
pants are women, and the judges are men, this is to endorse the Dworkin 
view of the law as gendered power relations. Mediation has the potential to 
change that power dynamic, but because the form of mediation developed 
is dose to adjudication, that opportunity has been lost in New Zealand. 
Consequently, women are disempowered, rather than empowered. That 
disempowering is ongoing. Only one of the women participants in the 
Barry and Henaghan analysis reported that mediation had given her the 
confidence to resolve future conflicts with her ex-husband without turning 
to the court. 
A third controlling factor occurring also in mediation conferences is the 
role of the lawyer. Women are not empowered when the decision is judge-
rnade, and the arriving at that decision is taken out of their hands by law-
yers who lead. sz 
Good lawyers run mediation conferences. They set up the entire framework of 
the mediation conference and dictate what is discussed. Lawyers can define the 
51 Above n 46, 86-87. 
:-;2 Above n 46, 88. 
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parameters of the discussions and by cutting out the other person's concerns 
you are going to promote your client's interests. 
l2 
On occasion, the lawyer fills a re-empowering role: 53 
1 feel very nervous in the conference with the judge sitting up front. I couldn't 
have managed on my own .... My lawyer made me feel safe . . .. 
Its need only serves to underline the disempowering effect of the whole 
mediation conference. 
These problems are not without solutions. I have already argued that 
counselling currently attempts two tasks-therapy and problem solving-and 
frequently fails the former. I have suggested therefore that these two pro-
cesses be separated into counselling and mediation. Mediation should thus 
become a separate but complementary process to counselling with lay me-
diators. The current mediation conference should become third stage dis-
pute resolution, operating as informal adjudication. At that point, the ad-
versarial approach of lawyers, and the inevitable judicial role of the Judge, 
is not inappropriate. It is inappropriate without genuine mediation preced-
ing it. 
The problem of the power imbalance between the parties in counselling 
and the new mediation I propose must be addressed by counsellors/media-
tors. They must adopt an empowering role for women. Martha Shaffer54 
recommends that mediators be trained to recognize the factors that con-
tribute to power inequality for women-lower earning power, less negotiat-
ing experience, less career mobility, less knowledge of family finances, an 
inability to isolate her needs from those of her children. They must also be 
trained to accept that part of their role is to rectify power imbalances when 
they arise. 55 
53 
!)4 
55 
Above n 46, 88. 
M Shaffer "Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective" ( 1988) 46 Univer-
sity of Toronto Faculty of Law Rev r8r. 
t Iowever, to encourage this empowering role for the mediator is to turn 
women into the problem. It is not women, but the social and economic 
position of women which create problems of power imbalance in media-
tion. Hence Catharine Mack.innon's stance that before gender power 
imbalance can be rectified, the patriarchal structure of society iL~elf has to 
Ix· abolished. 
] 
If that is not possible, the mediator has an ethical responsibility to su~ 
pend the mediation. 56 
A fourth controlling factor is the mandatory nature of some counselling 
under section 10 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980. In the Maxwell 
Research, some counselling occurred in 94 per cent of cases. 57 In 64 per 
cent of cases, both the man and the woman attended at least one joint 
session. I submit it is wrong in principle that a process that is intended to 
be self-empowering requires this step. Rhonda Pritchard writes: 58 
l3 
I would now wish to assert that if we continue to require or urge that everybody 
should have counselling we are, at best, misunderstanding the purpose and process 
of counselling and, at worst, running a risk of procedure abuse. 
If a woman wishes to avoid counselling, especially conjoint counselling, 
that is her right. In the trauma of separation, in the midst of emotional 
crisis with its consequent low self esteem, a measure of control by the par-
ticipant is vital. To insist on counselling before a mediation conference or 
hearing is "as disempowering as making an order without hearing evi-
dence''. 59 
The principle of choice is essential in empowering women who have 
been subjected to violence. The inappropriateness of mediation of the bat-
tered women and their abusers has already been referred to. 60 Psychological 
characteristics common to battered women include learned helplessness 
resulting in passivity, low self-esteem, lack of self-confidence, a tendency to 
withdraw, discomfort when interacting with others. Such women are de-
pressed, shy, introverted and have difficulty with self-expression.61 
!'17 
59 
6o 
fo 
.J Folberg and A Taylor Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Con-
flicts without Litigation (Jossy-Bass, San Francisco, California, rg84) cited 
in J Wade "Forms of Power in Family Mediation and Negotiation" ( 1994) 
8 Australian journal of Family Law 57. . ,._,..,_, .2.e..cJ. c.-d Fo- , 11 -"Family Court Counselling Services and the ChangttiriJ'(Family Court 
Counselling Research Report r, Department of justice, Wellington, 1989). 
R Pritchard "Access to the Family Court-Meeting the Needs and Finan-
ces of the Consumer-A Counsellor's Perspective" (paper presented to 
"The Family Court ro Years On", New Zealand Family Law conference, 
Wellington, 1990) 210. 
Above n 57. 
Above n 39. 
C Jermane, M Johnson, N Lemon " Mandatory Custody Mediation and 
Joint Custody Orders in California: The Danger tor Victims of Domestic 
Violence" ( 1985) r Berkeley Women's LJ 175, 186. 
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One woman in the United States sent by the court to mediation report-
ed:62 
14 
I was forced to sit do~n with the man who for the past twelve years has abused 
me, intimidated me, controlled me by threats and scare tactics, emotionally 
tom me down and whom I truly fear. 
The fear is well founded. The Lapsley and Robertson research details in-
stances of women killed by their husbands after attending court-ordered 
counselling.63 
Refuge workers emphasize that the woman who has just separated from a 
violent partner, and who is in physical danger, is not ready for negotiating 
decisions. The Hamilton Family Court follows the practice of empowerment 
counselling for women before they make agreements.64 Women attend six 
weeks of counselling designed to build self-esteem before any dispute resolu-
tion is attempted.65 
The Lapsley research also suggested that Family Court counselling fails to 
confront the violence directly. The model focuses on family dysfunction, 
rather than on the violence of the abuser. Counselling values the relation-
ship more than ending the violence. Victims may be blamed for their vic-
timization. One informant commented: 
The system basically tells (the victim) there is something wrong with her by the 
mere fact that she has to go to counselling. Counselling presumes that you 
have a problem. That is what the system is saying to her: you have a problem. 
Come in-you need some counselling.66 
While Family Court Judges may dispense with a counselling referral where 
a separation order has been applied for and there is a history of violence,67 
they cannot if one partner seeks counselling. An abusive partner frequently 
does. lain Johnston suggests that where custody and access are issues there 
A Cagpon "Enduring Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered 
Women" ( r992) r5 Ilarvard Women's LJ 272, 279. 
H Lapsley, N Robertson and R Busch "Battered Women and the Justice 
System" [ r993J Buttenvorths Fam LJ 31. 
Alxive n 58, 10. 
l I Lapsley, N Robertson and R Busch "Domestic Protection Study: Family 
Court Counselling" r 1993] Buuenvorths Fam LJ g, 16. 
A.hove n 05, ro. 
Family Proceedings Act r98o, s ro(3)(a). 
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is still an expectation that the mother will enter into counselling with her 
panner.68 Women commonly feel obliged to attend counselling, because 
failing to attend is perceived to count against them. With the custody of 
children at stake, women are unlikely to risk appearing uncooperative.09 
Mandatory counselling disempowers; mandatory conjoint counselling of 
violence victims tells women that a patriarchal society excuses the abuser. 
This is doubly disempowering. Counselling must be a matter of choice, 
especially conjoint counselling. 
A final aspect of control in mandatory referral is the requirement on 
counsellors to attempt reconciliation (before conciliation).70 
If a woman is dear in her own mind that she wishes a relationship to 
end, it is quite inappropriate for the State to attempt to change that deci-
sion. For battered women, this exposes them to further danger. The re-
search reveals that partners can use the guise of reconciliation to keep 
extending conjoint counselling, which is, in reality, harassment of the 
abused ex-partner. 71 The legal requirement upon counsellors to attempt 
reconciliation as a first duty should be removed. 
15 
In counselling and mediation as currently practised, gender power rela-
tions are perpetuated in two ways. First, women's subordination is main-
tained by a power imbalance between herself and her partner, and herself 
and the counsellor/mediator. Second, it is maintained by · the denial of 
divorce in mandatory counselling, and by the requirement that she consider 
reconciliation with a panner she has already rejected. 
For many women, the process is a failure because it fails to empower 
them. 
68 "Domestic Violence: The Role of Counselling" ( 1985) r FLB 12. In 66 
Family Court files, where there was violence, and a custody/ access ques-
tion. a referral to counselling was made. There were no exceptions. 
While under the Domestic Protection Act 1982 there is no provision for 
referral to counselling after the order has been granted (s 37), commonly 
an applicant will want other orders, eg custody, and so counselling may 
still be directed. 
70 Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 12. 
71 Above n 65, r2. 
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N MEDIATION: GENDER-NEUTRAL STANDARDS: LIBER-
AL FEMINISM AND RIGHTS 
16 
Liberal feminists want formal equality for women-women must be treated 
the same as men (the sameness theory). So, while cultural feminists support 
'special laws' for women, eg special benefits for pregnant women, liberal 
feminists do not. Women are entitled to rights which men have.72 I reject 
this model. I demonstrate that, when applied to mediation/counselling, this 
model fails women in two respects. First, a facially gender neutral standard 
applied to custody/access questions favours fathers and the imposition of 
shared parenting. Secondly, the creation of equal rights (as in 'no fault' 
divorce) means not the gaining of new rights for women, but the loss of 
existing rights. Mediation assumes formal equality but does not deliver it. 
To empower women, it is necessary to recognize this and espouse women's 
rights. 
First, custody/access issues. Custody decisions which go to court are made 
"in the best interests of the child". Section 23 of the Guardianship Act 
affirms that the welfare of the child is paramount. This principle was first 
enunciated in statutory form in the Guardianship of Infants Act 1926, 
which also stated that neither the father nor the mother would have super-
ior legal claim to the children. This was a move away from the nineteenth-
century view that fathers automatically had custody of children by virtue of 
paternity. However, after 1926, case law evolved certain rules of thumb, 
which effectively defined what was best for children. A "maternal prefer-
ence" principle decided that children of "tender years" should be placed in 
the custody of their mothers; fathers should have custody of older boys; that 
families should be kept together, if possible. 73 
Today, section 23 is being redefined. The Guardianship Amendment Act 
1980 states categorically that there shall be no presumption that placing a 
72 For an explanation of liberal feminism or symmetrical feminists , refe r L 
Lacey " Introducing Feminist jurisprude nce: An Analysis of Oklahoma's 
Seduction Statute" ( 1990) 2fi/ 4 Tulsa ½I 775· 
n G Hall " The Welfare of the Child: A Literature Review" Family Court 
Custody and Access Research Report 1, Department of justice, Welling-
ton, 1989, 15. 
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child in the custody of either the father or the mother would best serve the 
welfare of the child. ;4 This is an explicit rejection of the maternal prefer-
ence tradition. 
Instead, the court is looking more sympathetically at shared parenting 
arrangements. As New Zealand law creates joint legal custody as of right in 
guardianship, ' 5 shared parenting means shared physical care of the children. 
This is not reflected in joint custody orders. Although these are increasing, 
they make up only five to seven per cent of orders. 76 Neither is joint cus-
tody Family Court policy. Rather, as Opie suggests: 77 
My sense is that although there is no legal presumption in favour of joint cus-
tody, it nonetheless enjoys a certain privilege within the Family Court system 
because it appears to meet the need for the child's contact with both parents, 
and it is this aspect of the arrangement which is given most emphasis. 
The position of 'privilege' has recently been boosted by the formula adopt-
ed in the Child Support Act 1991. If a child does not spend 40 per cent of 
their time with a liable parent, the amount of financial support levied from 
that parent rises. Indications are that liable parents are seeking greater 
access to their children. 78 Before considering how this apparently gender 
neutral status works against women, it is necessary to consider why the 
court's decisions impact on what occurs in counselling/mediation. 
First, in a court-based alternative dispute resolution system, parties bargain 
"in the shadow of the law". 79 The participants know that if they cannot 
resolve their custody dispute in counselling/mediation, the court will. So 
the stance of the court proper is always looming. 
Second, as already discussed, many counsellors and mediators adopt a 
'directive' stance. Indeed, agreements from judge-led mediation may not 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
Guardianship Amendment Act 1980, s 23( 1A) . 
Parents jointly make decisions concerning the child's upbringing, eg 
matters of religion, educalion. 
A Lee, A I Iarland, G I-Iall " Custody and Access Issues" in New 'Zealand 
Sujjrl'r.ge Centennial Women '.s Law Conference Papers (Conference Publishing, 
Wt'llington, 1993) 277, 279. 
A Opie " It's All Sort of Tied Up-A Critique of joint Custody" in New 
Zealand Sujfrllf(e Centennial Women '.s Law Conference Papers (Con.!erence 
Publishing, Wellington, 1993) 250. 
Sunday Sta:r Time~, Auckland, 17 April 1994. 
R1 I Mnookin and L Kornhauser " Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce" ( 1979) Yale LJ 950. 
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reflect participants' choice at all. Therefore, the ideological stance of the 
counsellor and especially the judge is most significant:80 
A party who wants to do something which is unreasonable or which a judge 
would not allow in court, or which is perhaps unconventional in that it doesn't 
fit in with the mainstream view on family law, will be put under fearful pressure 
from a judge virtually to the stage of a firm rebuttal from the judge, and certainly 
an indication of a lack of support. 
So the trend is towards shared parenting, or at least maximum contact with 
both parents. Why is the adoption of this model not necessarily in the 
interests of women? 
First, it represents a rejection of sole maternal custody, and endorses the 
widespread belief that such custody was damaging to the welfare of the 
children. The research81 into maternal custody claimed that the children 
suffered in terms of emotional development, behaviour and schooling.82 
Hall's review of the literature, however, concludes that a more significant 
cause of the children's problems was the material circumstances of many 
women after separation. A problem identified as the ''feminization of pover-
ty''. The solution is not shared parenting, but adequate provision for 
mother-headed households following marriage break up.83 • 84 
Further, the Hall literature review found that, as well as vindicating sole 
maternal custody, joint custody/shared parenting was not necessarily ideal. 
8o 
81 
N Barry and M Henaghan, quoting a lawyer interviewed in their survey 
for "Mediation in the Family Court" ( r986) r FLB 84. 
Most of it in the United States and sponsored by Fathers ' Rights groups 
who objected to child maintenance. The research also reflected the US 
legal situation, which denied guardianship to a father once custody was 
awarded to a mother, and left him only limited visitation rights. 
/\ Lee, /\ I Iarland, G Hall "Custody and Access Issues" in New ll(J,/,and 
Suffrage Centennial Women '.s Law Confmmce Paptm (Conference Publishing, 
Wellington, 1993) 282. 
V Ullrich in her examination of the Matrimonial Property /\et r~)76 (in 
"The Family Court 10 Years On", New Zealand Family Law conference, 
Wellington, 1990) 108 argues for reforms that take account of the way that 
child c;aring responsibilities are to be managed after marriage break up. 
She recognizes the societal gendered inequality in which the Act operates 
(the reduced earning capacity of women as the result of their broken 
careers because of the child care responsibilities and the lack of equal pay 
and employment equity) but says that the Act does not. 
It is hardly a gender-neutral concept to emphasize women's need of male 
support in effective child rearing. This is to make the woman ' lesser'. In 
reality, many women in partner relationships are effectively raising chil-
dren as solo parents. 
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It worked only "in the right circumstances"85 and it required a cooperative 
relationship between the parents. Yet half the judges surveyed&; said they 
sometimes awarded joint or shared custody to settle disputed cases!87 Thus, 
shared custody is a dubious arrangement. 
Its preference undermines women's choice of sole custody. In doing so, 
the court is also undermining the women's maternal role-the one which 
our gendered society has traditionally valued. 
19 
Second, the process of arriving at that joint custody/shared parenting ar-
rangement in mediation also reflects an undervaluing of the role society has 
traditionally endorsed for women. The rhetoric of joint custody of gender-
neutrality assumes previous equal experience of parenting. This assumption 
does not accord with current gendered roles and divisions of labour. Re-
search shows that a father's willingness to change nappies is commented 
upon as laudable, when the same care is taken for granted in women.88 A 
10 per cent investment of time by a father is evidence of paternal commit-
ment, but a mother's wish to work to support her children (which still gives 
her a greater investment of quality time with them than 10 per cent) 
throws doubt on her parental commitment. Opie points out that a mother 
who, in mediation, is concerned about her child's well-being if left to the 
care of the father in a shared parenting/joint custody arrangement is con-
sidered over-anxious, being unnecessarily protective. She has "an illegiti-
mate motive".89 But the woman may know that the father has minimal 
85 Above n 82. 
86 Above n 82. 
87 Current indications are that the court is hecoming more circumspect on 
awarding shared arrangements . For example, in R v R (High Court, Inver-
cargill Registry, 4 July 1994, FR 393/ 91) , a father unsuccessfully appealed 
a Family Court order for custody of the two children in favour of the 
mother with school holiday access for the father. the father sought shared 
custody with the childre n, alternating for larger periods. The High Court 
held there was insufficient cooperation and communication between the 
two parents for this to be in the best interests of the children. 
88 Above n 77, 2 51. A Opie, in her c989 PhD thesis undertook a qualitative 
investigation or eight families with voluntary joint custody arrangements. 
She concluded that shared parenting should be regarded as one possible 
mode or custody but not necessarily " the best" , and it certainly should 
not be used to try to resolve difficult custodial situations . G Hall "The 
Welfare or the Child, a Literature Review" (Family Court Custody and 
Access Research Report, Department of justice, Wellington, c989) . 
89 MA Fineman ·' Dominant Discourse, Professional Language and Legal 
Change in Child Custody Decision-Making" ( 1988) 101 Harv LR 735. 
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experience in caring for his children. In a different setting, a mother's anxi-
eties about leaving (young) children over several days with limited know-
ledge of the child and experience in childcare would be unlikely to be 
represented in this way and would instead be seen as part of a legitimate 
concern. 90 
Fineman in discussing the joint custody as an outcome of mediation in 
the United States concludes that the use of facially neutral rules has 
worked to perpetuate the gender inequality faced by women. 91 
There are more far-reaching dangers to this ideology of equality. As a 
corollary of assuming equal input of fathers into child care, the real impact 
of being the primary caregiver on women's private lives, careers, financial 
power during the marriage can be ignored. Divorced women are assumed 
not to face job and salary discrimination. So the ideology of equality "di-
verts attention away from structural inequalities which shape the lives of 
employed women''. 92 
The third problem with defining "best interests of the child" as a shared 
parenting arrangement is that it denies women the 'clean break' in their 
emotional and daily lives that the law seeks to grant a divorcing couple in 
their financial arrangements.93 
In fact, it forces a continuance of contact they may have sought to stop 
through divo~e. Ex-partners will have to negotiate and make decisions 
about many practical matters eg the frequency and logistics of movement 
between homes, the financing of the children, notification of school events, 
managing holidays, birthdays, Christmases, information exchange about the 
children. 
90 Above n 77, 246-247. 
gr MA Fineman The musion of Equa/,ity: The Rhetoric and Rudity of Divorce 
Reform (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, rg~p). 
92 SB Boyd "Child Custody, Ideologies and Employment" ( 1989) 3 CJWLR 
93 
II I. 
J Johnston and I Johnston "Marriage Breakdown: 'Clean Break' or Com-
pound Fracture?" ( r98!)) r FLB 3, 4 argue that the Matrimonial Property 
Act 1976 aims to allow the partners in a divorcing couple sufficient capital 
from their combined property to restart their lives independent of each 
other. I lowevcr, this fails for women. 
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The ideology of shared parenting assumes a level of cooperation which, as 
Opie points out, amounts almost to a denial of the reality of divorce.94 But 
in extreme circumstances, shared parenting can enable very controlling and 
violent behaviour to continue. Refuge workers saw three stages in the Fami-
ly Court process as exposing abused women-counselling, the Court case, 
and his access to the child.95 
l therefore recommend, first, training be given to counsellors and media-
tors in recognizing when joint custody-free access is appropriate; and sec-
ondly, that shared parenting should be regarded as one form of custody 
rather than the most desirable form. Where the marriage has been marked 
by violence or power imbalance, joint custody is regarded as unsuitable. An 
unwilling parent should never be pressured into accepting a joint custody 
agreement, and not held against them in terms of custody.96 
The second issue raised by liberal feminism in relation to mediation/coun-
selling concerns rights. Liberal feminists argue that women need only the 
same rights as men for their equality to be achieved. Unfortunately, the 
effect of the gender neutral standard discussed above is to deprive women of 
rights they once had, while delivering new rights to men. 
Theoretically, mediation avoids appeals to rights. As already discussed, 
first, in spite of the wording of the Guardianship Act 1968 which describes 
custody as a "right" to "care and possession" (s 3), it is not that parental 
right which is the focus of care arrangements but the best circumstances for 
the "welfare of the child". 
Second, no blame is attached to marriage breakdown. So no rights attach 
to being the 'innocent' party. 
However, as already seen, gender-neutrality, equality, is superficial only. 
Men's rights may not be endorsed but are maintained in the move to 
94 A Opie "Women and the Politics of Custody" in A Opie and B Morris 
(eds) Women and the Politics of Custody (Centre for Continuing Education, 
Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington) 8. 
95 l-1 Lapsley, N Rol>er~on, R Busch "Domestic Protection Study: Family 
Court Counselling, Part II" l 1993] Butterworths Fam 1..J g, ro. 
90 l'his view has received recent endorsement from the report of Davidson 
q into the granting of custody or unsupervised access to violent men. 
The report recognizes the statistical link between battering of wives and 
children. It advocates a presumption that violent spouses should not be 
given custody of children or unsupervised access unless they can demon-
strate children would be safe with them. 
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shared parenting and liberal access. I submit that rights discourse was aban, 
cloned in relation to custody because the rights that existed were maternal, 
not because 'rights talk' was no longer politically correct.9i In fact, rights 
discourse has seen a revival in the 'Father's Rights' movements which make 
it clear how thin gender-neutrality is. Shared parenting may enable fathers 
to control their property, the maintenance, and how it is spent. Similarly, 
'no fault' divorce allows the violent or adulterous husband to escape re, 
crimination. The battered wife must compromise and tolerate relationship 
counselling when she has been subjected to criminal acts (assaults or threats 
of assaults) by her partner. 
One mediator states: "Mediation emphasizes the personal responsibility of 
each party rather than the narrow assessment of legal fault .... Mediation 
is more effective in making each party accept his or her share of the re, 
sponsibility for the violence.' '98 
Thus, mediation is still right~based-even when pretending it is not. 
However, does that mean rights discourse is inappropriate, or a tool which 
feminism should reject? I submit it is not equal rights but women's rights 
which need to be asserted to empower women, gender,neutral equal rights 
having already failed. 
McCormick's theory of rights99 is useful in this context. The theory states 
that having a 'right' means that one's interests are protected by imposing 
legal or moral constraints on the acts of others with respect to one's inter, 
ests. Once it can be shown that there is an interest which should be pro, 
tected, then that interest is recognized by giving a right to individuals or 
groups who have that interest. Such a right then places obligations and 
duties on others to ensure that interest is protected. 
97 
98 
99 
M Fineman and A Opie "The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policy-
rnaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce" ( 1987) Wisconsin LR 107, 
116-117 discuss the men's groups of the r97os and their opposition to 
maternal rights as giving women preferential treatment. They locate the 
rise of shared parenting in the groups' attempts to counter the image of 
the · dead-beat dad'. 
LG Lerman "Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of 
Informal Dispute Resolution on Women" ( 1984) 7 Harvard Women's q 
72 , 75· 
McCormick Legal Ri{!;hls and Social Derrwrracy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
r984) 155· 
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The right is the primary caregiver principle which stems from the interest 
-an ongoing relationship with the child cared for. I advocate that where 
parental input is clearly unequal, and custody is in dispute, custody be 
awarded to the parent who has been the child's primary caregiver, ie feeds, 
bathes, dresses the children, changes their nappies, and performs other basic 
childcare tasks. Stability of care is more likely to be guaranteed to the child 
when there is no change in the person who is the primary caregiver, and if 
a woman has assumed that role during marriage, she is entitled to continue, 
if she wishes. 100 
According to Dworkin, rights can only be challenged when there is a 
clear competing right. 101 That right might be the right of the child, where 
the child's interest does not lie in the mother having custody (eg neglect, 
abuse, or in the case of an older child, the child's own choice), that right 
overrides the primary caregiver principle. 
Horowitz102 concedes that rights give "entitlement to the weak and 
powerless far beyond their actual political power." 103 
Radical feminists deny the value of rights. Mackinnon argues that appeals 
to rights (and to recognition of Gilligan's voices) blur the viewpoint so that 
we "cannot see that male supremacy is a complete societal system for the 
advantage of one sex over another". 104 While this is true, simply identifying 
it does not advance women. Logically, that societal system must be dis--
mantled. Asserting women's rights and appealing to different rights enables 
women to fight the system within the system and to work for its disman-
100 
IOI 
102 
!0;1 
104 
M I lenaghan in M I lcnaghan and W Atkin (eds) Family Law Poliry in New 
l,ealanri (Oxford University Press, Auck.land, 1992) 125, distinguishes 
between the child's affective relationship and the relationship with the 
provider of rare. I suhmit that the two are likely to coincide. 
A Dworkin ·'Taking Rights Seriously" in Simpson (ed) Oxfard Rua:ys in 
.furispnulence (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1~i72). 
L Horowitz .. Rights" ( 1988) 23 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law 
Review 393, ;195. 
P Williams "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed 
Rights" ( 1987) 22 l larvard Civil Riglm-Civil Liberties LR 401 rPcognizes 
1he importance of rights assertion in the struggle of black men and 
women. In New Zealand, the rights inherent in the Treaty of Waitangi 
and their assert.ion are proving a powerful weapon in the empowering of 
l\faori. S11ch rights can deliver political power as in the return of land or 
granting of fishing rights. 
Quoted in E Kingdom vt'hru '.~ Wrrmg with Rights '.1-Problnns Jar Feminist 
Politics of Law (Edinburgh University Press, Edinbmgh, 199r) 5. 
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tling also. While women work for the degendering of society, why not gen-
der the rules in women's favour to equal the imbalance. 
Gilligan says that the assertion of rights helps women see the interest of 
self as moral. 105 The process of mediation is to deny self in the quest for 
compromise. Rights are necessary to restore to women an entitlement to 
self, and to empower them. 
V MEDIATION AND PRIVATE LAW 
One final area of feminist criticism remains to be addressed. Mediation 
raises the issue of the private-public dichotomy. Historically, the law has 
regarded the home as beyond the law's province. What was domestic was 
also private. Wife-battering or spousal abuse were treated less seriously than 
assault on a stranger which introduced a public element. The law con-
cerned itself in divorce because society was affected. Public interest required 
stable families to constitute a stable society. Modem divorce allows dissolu-
tion to be private law, with no public attributing of blame. 
Mediation is a private, confidential process. it has taken marriage dissolu-
tion out of the public arena. The only requirement is that both parties 
agree. The Family Proceedings Act 1980 (s 18) protects the confidentiality 
of client's disclosures during counselling and in mediation conferences. In 
Lawson v Lawson Judge Mahoney commented that: 106 
The confidentiality of counselling carried out under the Family Proceedings Act 
is absolute. It is important to the integrity of our system that there can be no 
exceptions. 
But feminist analysis suggests there are benefits to women in public adjudi-
cation-where courts can clearly signal to society the obligations of ex-
spouses to each other and their children. 107 
105 
106 
107 
C Gilligan In a Different Voice (I larvard University Press, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts, 1982) 149. 
( 1~J86) 4 NZFLR 380. 
Lapsley, RoberL~on and Busch demonstrate 1hat confidentiality also puts 
safoty at risk, eg disclosures which indicate the possibility or child abuse 
cannot he conveyed to eitJ1er 1he other parent or the court. Some crnm-
~cllors 11Se 'code words ' in stamlarc.l rcporL~. eg the counsellor is not al-
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Thus, as Astor and Chinbn point out. the danger of increased use of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution is that women's issues would fade from the 
public agenda and '' decisions about issues of importance to women could be 
made according to norms which are unarticulated and unable to be chal-
lenged." 108 I submit that this is exactly what is happening. 
I therefore consider that mediator's reports should contain detailed con-
tent, not simply a tabulated agreement (assuming counselling and mediation 
are separated, as discussed above). Further, if the current process is retained, 
it is quite wrong for the same judge who chaired a mediation conference to 
subsequently hear the case. This is a clear breach of confidentiality, as 
material presented in mediation will be known to the judge. Even worse, 
one of the parties has already rejected the judge's 'directive'. This must 
make a fair hearing of the issues untenable. Specifically, if a process is to 
empower women, it cannot be taken out of public scrutiny claiming confi-
dentiality, and then be selective about the confidentiality it protects. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has reviewed women's experience of mediation/counselling 
, and related it to the various schools of feminist legal analysis. It 
found the comfortable assumptions, upon which belief in the 'success' of 
the Family Court is based, to be erroneous. 'Success' eludes women when 
the system fails to meet the feminist objective of empowering women. The 
benefits for women are simply not there. 
The confusion over what counselling ought to do means the cultural 
feminists 'voice' is not heard; the dynamic of counselling and mediation 
means women are controlled, inequalities between the participants cannot 
lowed to slate that access should not be recommended. She is only al-
lowed· to report whether an agreement has been reached between the 
parties and the terms of that agreement. However, by stating that she 
believes there is a need for appointment of counsel [or the child, the 
counselling coordinator knows automatically that there is some concern. 
f"his is unsatisfactory. ··Family Court Counselling" I 1993] Buttenvorths 
Fam fJ 3. 
rn8 11 Astor and C Chink.in Disfmte Resolution in Australia (Buuenvorths, Syd-
ney, 1992) 112. 
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be addressed without turning women into the problem rather than the 
gendered society that creates women's powerlessness; the mediator/counsel-
lor is 'directive' and his/her direction reflects the thinking of the court 
which, while espousing gender-neutral rules (which liberal feminists advo-
cate), may work to further men's interests; mandatory counselling and re-
conciliation counselling deprive women of choice and force many to toler-
ate attempts to restore relationships and understand the violence of an 
abuser they may never wish to see again; mediation, under the guise of 
confidentiality, occurs beyond the scrutiny of public review. 
The result is a system which, as radical feminists maintain of law, perpet-
uates gender inequality. 
Finally, I have recommended some changes to degender the process. They 
include the separation of counselling and mediation, the training of lay 
mediators to actively redress power imbalances, the use of Judge-led media-
tion conferences only as a third stage, the retention of sole custody as an 
equally desirable option, the recognition of women's rights in the primary 
caregiver principle and public review of mediation. 
Mediation/counselling is a form of alternative dispute resolution. But the 
structure and thinking of the Family Court in New Zealand are denying 
women the flexibility the term "alternative" promises. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
1 The Family Proceedings Act 1980 
The irreconcilable breakdown of the marriage is the only ground for its 
dissolution, and it can be established only by the couple living apart for 
two years. 
A marriage cannot be dissolved unless the court is satisfied that suitable 
arrangements have been made for the care of the children of the marriage. 
To assist separating parents, the Family Court is a conciliation service 
with court proceedings as a last resort. 109 The two stages of conciliation are 
counselling and mediation. 
A Counselling 
There are three categories of reference for counselling: 
27 
(a) on request-by one of the spouses (s 9). Prior to the filing of pro-
ceedings or the commencement of negotiations for a separation agree-
ment. The majority of requests come from people seeking to persuade a 
spouse to accept a separation decision or, conversely, to dissuade a spouse 
from such a decision. 110 
(b) mandatory referral-after an application for a separation order or 
an application for custody (s 10). 
(c) discretionary counselling (s 19)-when the Court considers at any 
stage in the proceedings that such counselling may promote reconciliation 
or conciliation. Increasingly, conditions are being attached to 
custody/access orders requiring parties to attend counselling to facilitate 
the implementation of the orders. 
There is provision in the Act for a Family Court judge to direct that the 
matter not be referred to counselling if there has been violence (s 10(3)(a)). 
This applies only to mandatory counselling. But if one party requests coun-
selling, then counselling must occur. It is at the discretion of the counsel-
rog M I Ienaghan and W Atkin Family Law Polil) in New Zealand (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Auckland, 1992) 87. 
110 L Beatson " Shifting Gears: Counselling in the Family Court" ( 1985) 1 
FLB 19. 
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ling coordinator as to whether counselling will be individual or conjoint, 
regardless of whether it is requested or directed. 
The counsellor's role is to explore whether the relationship is at an end, 
:md then to help the parties see the available options (s 11). The first duty 
is to attempt reconciliation, then conciliation. 
The growth in the number of counselling referrals from under 4,000 in 
1982 to 11,778 in 1988 to 14,117 in 1990-1991 has resulted in an expan-
sion of couple counsellors. 111 There are now at least 500 private counsellors 
or agencies who accept fumily Court referrals. 
B Mediation 
Mediation follows the failure to reach agreement in counselling. The 
mediator's role is to help the parties identify the matters in dispute and to 
try to obtain agreement on them (s 14). The mediator is a Family Court 
judge. Lawyers are present at mediation conferences. Judges have the power 
to make consent orders and it is possible for the judge who was the media-
tor to ultimately hear a defended hearing. 112 
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EM Maxwell, R Pritchard and J Robertson A Cmmsellor's Perspective on the 
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2 The Guardianship Act 1968 
A The Guardianship Amendment Act 1980 
If parents are living together, or married, at the time of the child's birth, 
they both have automatic legal rights-a right of control over the upbring-
ing of the child and a right to care and possession of the child. 113 The right 
of control over upbringing is entrenched, it is a fundamental right of legal 
parenthood. The right to care and possession is custody. It can be given 
away by agreement as well as taken away by court order. 114 
Section 23 affirms that 'the welfare of the child' is the first and para-
mount consideration in custody decisions. 
The Guardianship Amendment Act 1980 provides that the gender of the 
parent must not be taken into consideration in custody and access proceed-
ings. It also provides that the conduct of any parent should be taken into 
account only when it is relevant to the welfare of the child. 
rr3 
114 
Section 3. 
Sections r r and 18. 
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